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Abstract 
This paper proposes to examine whether and how the introduction of the Euro changed 
the impact of taxes on the economy or influenced the direction of tax policy. The paper 
surveys potential theoretical channels through which tax policy and exchange rate 
regimes are interrelated (capital mobility, strategic tax setting and trade policy). It is 
difficult to find strong empirical evidence of major, unique changes in the impact or 
determination of tax policy following the introduction of the Euro owing. The internal 
market has had by far a greater impact and it has affected all European Union countries. 
Nevertheless, we highlight that going forward certain specific aspects deserve attention. 
The most important concerns the use of tax policy by individual EMU countries to 
improve competitiveness by changing the mix of taxes and thereby achieving an 
internal devaluation.  A second issue deserving attention concerns tax competition 
particularly in the area of corporation tax. We provide some tentative evidence that 
capital movements to and from Euro area countries have become more responsive to the 
levels of corporate taxation.   
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1  Introduction 
At least since the Delors Report, much attention has been devoted to the implications of 
the introduction of a common currency for the conduct of budgetary policy and for the 
appropriate nature of fiscal arrangements between countries. However, tax policy as 
such has not been seen as raising any specific issues for the coming into existence a 
common currency. The Euro has not been closely associated with changes in tax policy 
nor has concern been expressed that the domestic tax systems of Euro area countries are 
influencing economic activity in the Euro area relative to non-Euro area countries.   
At the same time, domestic tax policy decisions within EU member states have been 
increasingly affected by decisions taken at the EU level. “Tax competition” and the 
impact of globalisation on the degree of autonomy of tax policy appear to dominate EU 
wide tax policy debates. Domestic policy within individual countries also appears to be 
influenced by decisions taken in other EU countries.  
It is somewhat surprising that there has been little discussion of the linkages between 
the Euro and tax policy within the Euro area (and possibly in an indirect fashion for 
other countries) since many of the issues associated with tax policy (for example, 
“competitiveness”) overlap with broader policy concerns.  
This paper proposes to examine whether and how the introduction of the Euro changed 
the impact of taxes on the economy or influenced the direction of tax policy. It also 
seeks to identify any potential problem areas. A two-pronged framework is adopted to 
provide guidance in interpreting the importance and the potential magnitude of the 
influence of the Euro on tax policy (and possibly of tax policy on the Euro). The first   4
follows the three traditional functional branches of analysis put forth by Richard 
Musgrave (1958): “stabilisation, allocation and distribution”
1.   
The other useful framework is that set forth by Frenkel and Razin (1987) to examine the 
international transmission channels or spillover effects of domestic tax policy. These 
consist in focusing on price, wealth and tax-revenue erosion channels.  The price 
channel examines the impact of tax changes on the relative prices of goods and financial 
assets. The wealth channel analyses how changes in tax policy can redistribute holdings 
of physical and financial assets across countries, individuals and generations. The tax-
revenue erosion channel is a by-product of the former two and examines how tax policy 
changes may be induced by the erosion of tax revenues and can lead to strategic 
behaviour on the part of the fiscal authorities.  
The question of whether the Euro has affected the uses of tax policy for stabilisation 
purposes has many dimensions. The most obvious dimension is the concern with 
whether countries that joined the Euro adopted more restrictive tax policies in order to 
comply with the Maastricht criteria than countries that opted to remain outside the Euro 
area, and that in so doing these countries chose to change the composition of tax 
revenues. There is strong anecdotal evidence that this took place in the build up to the 
Euro in the cases of Italy and Greece. In this paper we substantiate the evidence of 
increased tax pressure and show that the increase in tax pressure did not continue once 
the Euro was adopted. We also examine whether the introduction of the Euro resulted in 
a changing composition of tax revenues. Another dimension concerns whether Euro 
area countries have been forced to use tax policy to accommodate idiosyncratic shocks 
                                                 
1 We do not propose to examine the issues associated with “tax assignment” and deeper integration of 
Euro area countries relative to the other members of the European Union.    5
which in other circumstances could have been dealt with by exchange rate adjustments. 
We shall discuss this issue with respect to proposals regarding “internal devaluations”.  
As regards allocation effects, theoretical models strongly suggest that shifts from 
destination to origin based taxes, from income to consumption taxes, and from 
residence to source based taxes can alter equilibrium exchange rates. To be sure the 
magnitude of the interaction between taxes and exchange rate regimes is not well 
understood and there is unfortunately very little (hard) evidence to corroborate some of 
the implications of theoretical conjectures regarding potential interactions between 
exchange rate regimes and taxes. At the same time it is important to note that the 
introduction of the Euro led to a dramatic reduction in risk premia and market 
segmentation. This in turn has made tax differentials a more significant relative factor in 
investment decisions and created a climate potentially more conducive to tax arbitrage. 
We discuss these various potential linkages drawing on various strands of literature that 
link taxes to trade and to exchange rates.  
Capital market integration and tax competition are alleged to limit redistribution 
because on the one hand it is more difficult for the single country to tax the rich and 
mobile, and on the other redistributive policies may attract poor individuals from 
foreign countries. There is evidence to suggest increasing inequality in the Euro area at 
the same time as overall economic performance has improved. At the same time this 
development does not appear to have limited the ability of member states to use the tax 
lever to redistribute income.   
In drawing any conclusions regarding the effects of tax policy in the Euro area, it is 
important to realise that governments are not passive participants to the potential 
changes in tax incidence which are induced by a move towards fixed exchange rates.   6
Strategic responses cannot be analysed in a simple incidence model since tax setting 
behaviour becomes an endogenous decision. It is possible that governments attempt to 
improve their terms of trade or borrowing and lending on international financial markets 
by changing the level or composition of taxes or utilise tax policy to attract mobile 
factors of production to their tax jurisdictions.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section examines 
structure of tax revenues in the Euro area and the changes that have occurred in recent 
decades. In section three we turn to discuss the potential linkages between EMU and tax 
policy, focusing on financial and real capital mobility, changes in strategic interactions 
between governments and the potential impact of changes in tax policy on the trade 
balance.  We then examine in section four some empirical evidence regarding tax policy 
and EMU in three specific areas: the impact of capital market integration on the tax 
burden of labour and capital; the effects of EMU on progressivity; the relationship 
between taxes, exchange rates and employment. In the final section we highlight some 
potential areas that may require changes in tax policy going forward while the final 
provides some tentative overall conclusions on how tax policy has changed in the EMU 
area.  
2  The structure of  tax systems in the Euro area 
2.1  Main features and trends of tax systems prior to EMU  
On balance the Euro area has been a “high tax” zone at least since the mid-1980s. As 
can be seen from Graph 1 the increase in the overall tax levels of tax pressure took place 
in two successive waves. The first and very rapid increase took place between 1970 and 
the early 1980s, and saw the tax to GDP ratio within the Euro-zone rise by 6 percentage 
points from 35 to 41%. The overall tax burden then stabilised at this higher level for   7
roughly a decade before increasing again by a further three percentage points during the 
1990s. Since 2000 the tax burden has stabilised at a rate around 41%.  
Graph 1: Long term trends in general government total expenditure, total revenue 
































































































Total expenditure Total Revenues Total Tax Revenues  
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data 
 
The rise of total revenue as a share of GDP was driven, with a lagged effect, by the 
rapid growth of government expenditure that began in the 1960s and continued through 
to the mid-1990s. While differing in size and composition across countries the general 
rise in expenditure was mainly the result of expanding social transfers in the 70s and 
80s triggered by changes enacted a decade earlier as well as the need to confront a sharp 
slowdown in economic activity and an increasing level of unemployment that followed 
the first and second oil price shocks. The increase in expenditures was initially largely 
financed through a persistent and widening budget deficit (European Commission 
2000).  By the early 1990s, the period of rising government expenditure came to an end   8
with the ratio of expenditures to GDP peaking in 1993. In the years that followed, 
however, total tax revenue continued to rise (European Commission 2000, Carone et. al. 
2007). 
The rise in the ratio of tax revenues to GDP between 1970 and 1990 was a general 
feature of the EU area. It is also interesting to note that on average the increase in tax 
pressure of EU countries was far more significant than that of other OECD area 
countries during this period. Nevertheless a number of EU countries were able to 
stabilise their total-tax to GDP ratios in the 1970s (Ireland and the UK at around 35%) 
or in the early 1980s (Germany at around 40% and the BENELUX countries at around 
45%). 
Over this time period, the overall share in total tax revenues of direct and indirect taxes 
and of social security contributions remained fairly stable - at around 30-35% - after 
allowing for changes associated with the business cycle (Carone et. al. 2007, Cnossen 
2002). The only notable change was a mild increase in the relative importance of social 
security contributions and a decrease in indirect taxation (mainly through a reduction in 
excises). However, this overall stability masked sharp differences in the composition of 
revenues across countries that have persisted up to this day.    9
Table 1 Change in Tax Pressure (1970-2006) 
Tax Revenue/GDP Ratio 
    1970 1980 1990 1995  2000  2005 
AUSTRIA     33,9      39,0      39,6     41,3     42,8     42,0  
BELGIUM     33,9      41,3      42,0     43,8     45,2     45,5  
BULGARIA           -    33,1     35,9  
CYPRUS             26,7     30,0     35,6  
CZECH REPUBLIC              36,2     33,8     36,3  
DENMARK     38,5      43,1      46,5     48,8     49,4     50,3  
ESTONIA             37,9     31,3     30,9  
FINLAND     31,7      35,9      43,9     45,7     47,2     43,9  
FRANCE     31,7      35,9      43,9     42,7     44,1     44,0  
GERMANY     35,7      41,6      39,5     39,8     41,9     38,8  
GREECE     21,9      23,6      28,7     32,6     37,9     34,4  
HUNGARY             41,6     38,5     38,5  
IRELAND     28,4      31,0      33,1     33,1     31,7     30,8  
ITALY     25,7      29,7      37,8     40,1     41,8     40,6  
LATVIA             33,2     29,5     29,4  
LITHUANIA             28,6     30,1     28,9  
LUXEMBOURG     23,5      35,7      35,7     37,1     39,1     38,2  
MALTA             27,3     28,2     35,3  
NETHERLANDS     34,1      41,8      41,1     40,2     39,9     38,2  
POLAND             37,1     34,0     34,2  
PORTUGAL     18,4      22,9      27,7     31,9     34,3     35,3  
ROMANIA           -  -    28,0  
SLOVAKIA             39,6     32,9     29,3  
SLOVENIA             40,2     38,6     40,5  
SPAIN     15,9      22,6      32,5     32,7     33,9     35,6  
SWEDEN     38,2      46,9      52,7     49,0     53,4     51,3  
UNITED KINGDOM     37,0      35,2      36,5     35,6     37,6     37,0  
OTHER OECD Countries                   
AUSTRALIA     21,5      26,6      28,5     28,8     31,1     31,1  
CANADA     30,9      31,0      35,9     35,6     35,6     33,5  
ICELAND     27,4      29,6      31,0     31,2     38,3     42,4  
JAPAN     19,6      25,4      29,1     26,9     27,1     16,8  
KOREA  -     17,2      18,9     19,4     23,6     25,6  
MEXICO  -     16,2      17,3     16,7     18,5     19,3  
NEW ZEALAND     26,0      30,6      37,4     36,6     33,6     36,6  
NORWAY     34,4      42,5      41,5     41,9     42,8     44,3  
SWITZERLAND     19,8      25,3      26,0     27,8     30,5     30,0  
TURKEY     12,5      17,9      20,0     22,6     32,3     32,3  
UNITED STATES     27,0      26,4      27,3     27,9     29,9     26,8  
EU-27                   
weighted average             39,7     40,7     39,6  
arithmetic average             37,7     37,7     37,4  
EA-13                   
weighted average             39,9     41,3     39,9  
arithmetic average             38,6     39,9     39,1  
EU-25                   
weighted average             39,7     40,9     39,7  
arithmetic average             37,7     37,9     37,8  
OECD TOTAL     27,8      31,4      34,2     35,1     36,6     36,6  
OECD EUROPE     28,5      33,8      36,5     37,6     39,1     39,1  
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Table 2 Structure of tax revenue Eurozone ( weighted averages) 
     EU    EU25  EU13 
    1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Consumption  38,0 31,6 31,1 27,9 28,0 28,3 26,5 26,9 26,9 
VAT  16,1 16,3 17,9 16,7 17,1 17,3 16,0 16,8 16,6 
Excices
a  21,9 15,3 13,2 11,2 10,8 10,9 10,5 10,1 10,3 
             
Labour  48,8 56,9 55,1 56,0 55,3 56,4 58,6 57,8 58,8 
Income Tax
b  16,2 19,7 18,8 21,9 23,8 23,6 20,2 22,5 22,4 
Social  security  contributions  32,6 37,2 36,3 34,2 31,5 32,8 38,4 35,3 36,4 
             
Capital  13,2 11,5 13,8 16,1 17,0 15,5 15,1 15,6 14,5 
Corporation  Tax  5,3 5,1 6,5 7,5 8,0 6,7 7,0 7,7 6,5 
Income  tax  2,8 2,1 3,2 1,8 2,2 2,0 1,7 1,9 1,7 
Property taxes
c  5,1 4,3 4,1 6,8 6,8 6,9 6,4 6,0 6,2 
                             
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
a Taxes on tobacco, alcohol, petrol, motor vehicles and other specific goods and service.  
b Including taxed on labour income imputed to the self-employed and payroll taxes 
c Taxes on net wealth, immovable property and property transfers. Sources: Updated from Martinez-
Mongay (2000) and OECD (2001) 
Source: Cnossen 2002 and own calculations based on European Commission (2007) 
 
While the overall structure and composition of tax revenues did not change 
dramatically, there were profound changes within the broad groups of taxes and in the 
actual mechanics and workings of individual taxes. As far as consumption taxes are 
concerned, VAT spread to all countries that acceded to the EU throughout this period. 
Moreover, the average top VAT rate increased in most countries and there was a general 
tendency to reduce the number of rate bands. The influence of EU directives also 
influenced the dispersion of VAT rates across countries
2 reducing it significantly over 
time. EU directives also aligned the structure of alcohol and tobacco excises more 
closely.   
                                                 
2 The efficiency of tax collection of VAT varies significantly across EU countries.    11 
Table 3 VAT rates  
   Implemented     Standard rate     Reduced rate  Domestic   Specific rate applied   
                                                zero rate (2)   within specific region  
      1976  1980  1984  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2003  2005  2006          
Australia  2000  - - -  -  -  - - - - 10,0  10,0  10,0  10,0  -  yes  - 
Austria  1973  18,0  18,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  20,0  10.0 and 12.0  no  16  (a) 
Belgium  1971  18,0 16,0 19,0  19,0  19,0  19,50 20,5 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 6  and  12.0  yes  - 
Canada  1991  -  -  -  -  -  7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -  yes  15    (b) 
Czech Republic  1993  -  -  -  -  -  -  22,0  22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 19,0 19,0 5  no  - 
Denmark  1967  15,0 22,0 22,0  22,0  22,0  25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 -  yes  - 
Finland  1994  -  -  -  -  -  -  22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 8.0  and  17.0  yes  - 
France  1968  20,0  17,6  18,6  18,6  18,6  18,6  18,6  20,6  20,6  20,6  19,6  19,6  19,6  2.0 and 5.5  no  0.9, 2.1, 8.0, 13.0, 19.6 (c) 
                                                   1.05, 1.75, 2.1 and 8.5 (d) 
Germany  1968  11,0 13,0 14,0  14,0  14,0  14,0 15,0 15,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 7  no  - 
Greece    1987  -  -  -  16,0  18,0  18,0  18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 19,0 4.5  and 9.0  no  3.0, 6.0, 13.0  (e) 
Hungary  1988  -  -  -  25,0  25,0  25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 20,0 5  and  15  no  - 
Iceland  1989  -  -  -  -  22,0  22,0 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 14  yes  - 
Ireland  1972  20,0 25,0 23,0  25,0  23,0  21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 4.8  and  13.5  yes  - 
Italy  1973  12,0 15,0 18,0  19,0  19,0  19,0 19,0 19,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 4.0  and  10.0  yes  - 
Japan  1989  -  -  -  -  3,0  3,0 3,0 3,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 -  no  - 
Korea    1977  -  10,0 10,0  10,0  10,0  10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 -  yes  - 
Luxembourg  1970  10,0  10,0  12,0  12,0  12,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  3.0, 6.0 and 12.0  no  - 
Mexico  1980  -  10,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  10,0  10,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0  15,0     yes  10   (f) 
Netherlands  1969  18,0 18,0 19,0  20,0  18,5  17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 19,0 19,0 19,0 6  no  - 
New  Zealand  1986  -  -  -  10,0  12,5  12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 -  yes  - 
Norway  1970  20,0 20,0 20,0  20,0  20,0  22,0 22,0 23,0 23,0 23,0 24,0 25,0 25,0 8.0  and  13.0  yes  - 
Poland    1993  -  -  -  -  -  -  22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 7  yes  - 
Portugal  1986  -  -  -  17,0  17,0  16,0  16,0  17,0  17,0  17,0  19,0  19,0  21,0  5.0 and 12.0  no  4.0, 8.0 and 15.0  (g) 
Slovak  Republic  1993  -  -  -  -  -  -  25,0 23,0 23,0 23,0 20,0 19,0 19,0     no  - 
Spain  1986  -  -  -  12,0  12,0  13,0  16,0  16,0  16,0  16,0  16,0  16,0  16,0  4.0 and 7.0  no  2.0, 5.0, 9.0 and 13.0  (h)    12 
   Implemented     Standard rate     Reduced rate  Domestic   Specific rate applied   
                                                zero rate (2)   within specific region  
      1976  1980  1984  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2003  2005  2006          
                                                   0.5 and 4.0  (i) 
Sweden  1969  17,65 23,46  23,46  23,46 23,46  25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 6.0  and  12.0  yes  - 
Switzerland  1995  -  -  -  -  -  -  6,5 6,5 6,5 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 2.4 and 3.6  yes  - 
Turkey 1985  - - - 10,0 10,0 10,0  15,0 15,0 15,0 17,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 1.0  and  8.0  no  - 
United  Kingdom  1973  8,0  15,0 15,0  15,0  15,0  17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 5  yes  - 
Unweighted average     15,6  16,6  17,8  17,2  16,8  16,5  17,5  17,8  17,9  17,8  17,8  17,7  17,6          
Key to abbreviations:                                                    
- : Not applicable                                                    
n.a.: Data not provided                                                    
Explanatory notes:                                                    
1. Rules as of 1. day of the tax year (1. January in all countries except Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). 
2. "Domestic zero rate" means tax is applied at a rate of zero to certain domestic sales. It does not include zero rated exports.  
Country-specific 
footnotes:                                                    
(a) Applies in Jungholz and Mittelberg. 
(b) The provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia have harmonized their provincial sales taxes with the federal Goods and Services Tax and levy a rate of 15%  
Other Canadian provinces, with the exception of Alberta, apply a provincial tax to certain goods and services. These provincial taxes apply in addition to GST.  
(c) Applies in Corsica 
(d) Applies to overseas departments (DOM) excluding French Guyana.  
(e) Applies in the regions Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Dodecanese, Cycladen, Thassos, Northern Sporades, Samothrace and Skiros.              
(f)  Applies in the border regions. 
(g) Applies in Azores and Madeira. 
(h) Applies in the Canary Islands 
(i) Applies in Ceuta and Melilla.   13
There were also very significant changes in the functioning of personal and corporate 
income taxes. In the case of the personal income taxes, most countries reduced the top 
personal tax rate (Table 4) and reduced the number of rate bands (Messere et al. 2003). 
At the same time, in many countries the tax base was widened; for example, many 
countries limited the deductibility of interest. Many countries also reduced the 
differential treatment of various types of financial instruments. The 1980s and early 
1990s saw the gradual dismantling of exchange controls and in many instances 
significant changes in inbound and outbound capital movements. These changes were 
also associated with the growing institutionalisation of savings and of cross-border 
portfolio capital flows.  
 
As regards the corporation tax, one can observe a number of common trends taking 
place over time. The first trend was the decline in the statutory tax rate beginning in the 
mid-1980s (we shall discuss this trend at greater length in section 4.1) (Table 5). The 
reduction in statutory rates was accompanied by a widening of the tax base resulting by 
a reduction of exemptions but most significantly by a cut in the rate of depreciation 
allowances. Finally, many EU countries in the 1970s introduced some form of 
imputation system between corporate and personal income taxes. As we shall see below 
by the 1990s the enthusiasm for tax integration had waned considerably.    14
Table 4. Top individual income tax rates 1975-2005  
   1975 1980  1985 1990 1995  2000  2005 
Australia 65  61.5
(1) 60 48 47 48.5  48.5 
Austria  62 62  62 50 50 45  50 
Belgium  60 76.3  71.6  55 55 63.9  53.5 
Canada 47  61.9
(1) 34 29 29 46.4  46.4 
Czech Republic          43  32  32 
Denmark 40  66
(1) 39.6  68  63.5  59.7 59.7 
Finland  51 51  51 43 39 48.7  51.8 
France 60  60  65  51.8    53.3  55.9 
Germany  56 56  56 53 53 53.8  45.2 
Greece  63 60  63 50 45 45  40 
Hungary       50  44  40  38 
Iceland     38    45  40 
Ireland  77 60  65 56 48 44  42 
Italy  72 72  65 50 51 46.4  44.1 
Japan  75 75  70 50 50 50  50 
Korea, Republic of  63
(2) 89.3
(1) 55 50 45 44  38.5 
Luxembourg  57 58.4  57 56 50 47.2  38.9 
Mexico 42
(2) 55  55  35  35  40  30 
Netherlands  71 72  72 60 60 60  52 
New  Zealand  60 60  66 33 33 39  39 
Norway 73  75.4
(1) 40 17 13.7  47.5  43.5 
Poland         45  40  40 
Portugal   80
(1) 60  40  40  35  40 
Slovak Republic          42  35  19 
Spain  62 65.5  66 56 56 48  45 
Sweden 87  86.5
(1) 80 65 30 55.4  56.6 
Switzerland 44  41
(1) 11.5  11.5  11.5  43.2 42.1 
Turkey  68   55 50 55 35.6  30.6 
United Kingdom  83  83
(1) 60  40  40  40  40 
United States (Federal Data)  70  70  50  28  39.6  46.7  41.4 
(1) 1994 
(2) 1974 
Source: 1975-1995 Otpr World Tax Database; 2000-2005 OECD Taxing Wages database   15
Table 5 Statutory Tax Rates on corporate income including local taxes and 
surcharges 
    1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Austria  55 39 34 34 25 
Belgium  48  41  40,17 40,17 33,99 
Cyprus  42,5  42,5  25 29 10 
Czech  Republic  n.a.  n.a.  41 31 26 
Denmark  40 40 34 32 30 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  26 26 24 
Finland  59 41 25 29 26 
France  50  37  36,67 36,67 34,93 
Germany 52,8  57,7  56,8  51,63  38,29 
Greece  43,4  46 40 40 35 
Hungary  n.a.  40  19,64 19,64 17,68 
Ireland  45 43 40 24 12,5 
Italy 36,25  46,37  52,2  41,25  37,25 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a.  25 25 15 
Lithuania  n.a.  35 29 24 15 
Luxembourg 40  39,4  40,9  37,45  30,38 
Malta  32,5  32,5  35 35 35 
Netherlands  48 35 35 35 31,5 
Poland  n.a.  40 40 30 19 
Portugal  40  36,5 39,6 35,2 27,5 
Slovak  Republic n.a.  n.a.  40 29 19 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a.  25 25 25 
Spain  33 35 35 35 35 
Sweden  40 40 28 28 28 
United  Kingdom 52 34 33 30 30 
Australia  46 39 33 34 30 
Canada 46  38  38  44,6  36,1 
Iceland 0  0  0  30  18 
Japan 40  37,5  37,5  40,87  39,54 
Korea 30  30  30  30,8  27,5 
Mexico  42 36 34 35 30 
New  Zealand  45 33 33 33 33 
Switzerland 11,5  9,8  9,8  24,93  21,32 
Turkey  0  46 25 33 30 
United States  46  34  35  39,34  39,28   16
2.2  Tax Revenues and Tax structure in EMU countries: are they different and 
have they changed?  
The coincidence of EMU with a number of other developments it is difficult to carry out 
a proper analysis of the differentiating features of EMU on tax policy. We use four 
dummy variables to test whether a wide number of tax ratios have changed following 
entry in the European Union (Common Market) and the introduction of the Euro. The 
first dummy is equal to one if a country has actually introduced the Euro. The second is 
equal to one when a country is discussing whether to join the Euro area. The third is 
equal to one when a country is a member of the EU. The forth is equal to one if a 
country is discussing EU membership. We test the effects of the Euro against the OECD 
Group of Countries that are not members of the Euro area in the period from 1970 to 
2005. The regressions are repeated over four time period all ending in 2005. The results 
of these regressions should be merely interpreted as descriptions of the data and suffer 
from the absence of any adjustment for cyclical factors. 
As can be seen from Table 6,  EU countries have a much higher tax/GDP ratio relative 
to other OECD countries and ratio for the EMU area countries is on average even 
higher. It appears that this higher rate coincided with the announcement of the Euro
3 but 
not with the actual introduction of the Euro (1999). This suggests some degree of fiscal 
adjustment associated with the need to comply with the Maastricht criteria. Breaking 
down by type of tax it appears that the upward adjustment took place with employer 
related social security contributions. VAT revenues were unaffected. The impact of 
Euro is most visible on individual and corporate income taxes: EMU countries has 
lower individual income tax revenues and higher revenues from the corporate tax.  
                                                 
3 We have tested for the announcement of the Euro using alternatively the publication date of the Delors 
report and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The results remain largely unchanged.   17 
Table 6: Tax structure in EMU and OECD countries 
 
        85-05 90-05 95-05 00-05           85-05 90-05 95-05 00-05 
Total  Tax  Oecd  average  30.46 30.16 30.18 30.68   Individuals  Oecd  average  9.71  9.54  9.30  9.26 
 Revenues      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Euro  accession  -1.21  -1.22  -1.23 1.51      Euro  accession -2.16  -2.24 -1.68 3.16 
      (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.80)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.45) 
  Euro  discussion  3.28  2.85  -3.64 -8.00     Euro  discussion 0.21  -1.29 -5.79 -11.83 
      (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.20)         (0.75) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) 
  EU  accession  5.21 4.16 12.88 12.86     EU  accession 2.80  3.16  9.78 11.49 
      (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  EU  discussion  1.22 3.02 0.78 1.80     EU  discussion  -1.85  -0.46  -2.89  -3.43 
        (0.36) (0.04) (0.68) (0.48)           (0.05) (0.66) (0.04) (0.05) 
Social  Security  Oecd  average  2.81 2.53 2.43 2.49   Property  Oecd  average  2.24 2.37 2.35 2.31 
Contributions      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(Employers) Euro  accession  0.21 0.36 0.36 1.65     Euro  accession 0.14  0.09 0.06 -0.43 
      (0.60) (0.35) (0.42) (0.52)         (0.31) (0.49) (0.72) (0.65) 
  Euro  discussion  2.32 3.58 1.95 0.26     Euro  discussion -0.42  -0.80  -0.92  -0.24 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) 
 EU  accession  0.25  -0.77  1.72 1.80     EU  accession 1.09  1.32 1.84 1.57 
      (0.65) (0.20) (0.06) (0.14)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  EU  discussion  1.43 1.33 0.57 0.80     EU  discussion  -1.18  -1.10  -1.45  -1.34 
       (0.01) (0.02) (0.47) (0.47)           (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
P-values in round brackets   18 
Table 6: continues 
 
        85-05 90-05 95-05 00-05           85-05 90-05 95-05 00-05 
Social  Security  Oecd  average  1.56 1.62 1.78 1.88   Goods&  Oecd  average  9.66 9.45 9.42 9.50 
Contributions      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   Services      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(Employees) Euro  accession  0.28  0.31 0.37 1.25     Euro  accession -0.53  -0.51  -0.47 -1.56 
      (0.28) (0.25) (0.21) (0.08)         (0.20) (0.19) (0.28) (0.51) 
  Euro  discussion  0.64 1.26 1.55 0.83     Euro  discussion 0.40 0.10 -1.22  -0.33 
      (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32)         (0.28) (0.83) (0.05) (0.89) 
 EU  accession  0.83  0.45  0.14 -0.22      EU  accession 0.66  0.22  0.41 -1.36 
      (0.02) (0.28) (0.83) (0.79)         (0.23) (0.72) (0.65) (0.22) 
  EU  discussion  0.86 0.54 0.33 0.46     EU  discussion  1.47 2.39 3.51 5.39 
       (0.01) (0.18) (0.55) (0.53)           (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Corporate  Oecd  average  2.11 2.17 2.34 2.64   Value  added  Oecd  average  4.03 4.38 4.58 4.93 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Euro  accession  0.68 0.64 0.38 -1.11      Euro  accession  -0.03 -0.02 -0.24 -1.80 
      (0.00) (0.01) (0.20) (0.57)         (0.93) (0.94) (0.51) (0.04) 
  Euro  discussion  -0.10 -0.33 -0.12 1.40      Euro  discussion 0.98  0.53  -0.54 0.59 
      (0.63) (0.22) (0.78) (0.49)         (0.00) (0.21) (0.37) (0.57) 
 EU  accession  1.12  1.23  0.97 0.78     EU  accession 0.03  -0.23 0.73  0.58 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.40)         (0.94) (0.66) (0.38) (0.57) 
  EU  discussion  -0.36 -0.27 -0.13 -0.28     EU  discussion  2.08  2.44  2.56  2.81 
       (0.23) (0.44) (0.80) (0.73)           (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
P-values in round brackets   19
 
3   The links between EMU and tax policy 
It is difficult to establish a direct link between the advent of EMU and changes in the 
tax system. Firstly, while fiscal rules have been established for EMU they are not 
specific to taxation. Although tax collections are in many circumstances the easiest 
policy lever that can be utilised to achieve budgetary objectives there is no specific rule 
that mandates the use of tax policy. It should also be remembered that with few 
exceptions tax policy remains an area of national sovereignty among EU member states. 
Up to now, the “deeper integration” among EMU countries has not extended to tax 
policy. Secondly, the internal market programme which preceded EMU by a decade 
already introduced a number of very significant changes in tax policy whose 
implications have been fully appreciated only in recent years. One example has been the 
increased activism of the European Court of Justice in tax matters since the beginning 
of this decade. Thirdly, it should also be remembered that a several countries that are 
part of EMU were operating under a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime for over a decade 
prior to the introduction of the Euro. Fourthly, it is important to note that the Euro area 
countries are not a homogeneous group. the potential links between tax policy and EMU 
may differ by country size, as will the potential spillover size of effects. For example, a 
major tax change in a “large” country in the Euro area could potentially have an impact 
on the equilibrium exchange rate and thereby affect the overall trade balance of other 
Euro area countries. A similar change in a small country would not give rise to such 
spillover effects. Finally, many exogenous developments that have influenced the 
process of tax reform in EU member states, such as the high levels of unemployment in 
the nineties and the globalisation of capital markets have been impinging on all EU   20
countries and are independent of the existence of the Euro
4. Similarly, the so-called Tax 
Package (see Box 1) is addressed to all EU member states. 
 
Hence, in most respects it is arguable that the influence of the EMU on tax policy – if 
any - is a question of incremental change or a matter of “degree”. The remainder of this 
section reviews factors that may have altered the influences of taxes on economic 
decisions and the setting of tax policy largely from this standpoint.   
 
 
Box 1: The Commission view on fiscal implications of EMU 
The fiscal implications of EMU during the build up to monetary union were generally viewed through the 
lens of budgetary policy. For example, the One Market, One Money  Report (Emerson et al. (1990)) 
highlighted the role of budgetary policy in stabilizing the economy in case of temporary shocks or 
adjusting against a permanent shock, the potential for EMU to tighten the budget constraint and reduce 
fiscal autonomy, the impact of EMU on fiscal discipline, and the need for coordination to avoid the 
negative macroeconomic spillovers of national fiscal policies. An additional issue which was widely 
debated at the time was whether EMU required a larger budget at the EC level to provide for coinsurance 
among member States (Eichengreen, 1993, Masson, 1996).  
In discussing the implications of EMU for taxation and the provision of public goods, a major concern 
was whether tax competition would prompt the need for enforcing convergence in taxing and spending 
through harmonization or through the transfer of powers to a supranational government. Emerson et al. 
(1990) took the view that EMU would generally not entail major qualitative changes for taxation and 
spending with respect to the '1992 + EMS' reference situation: the largest part of the effects of economic 
union already resulted from the completion of the internal market and the specific effects of EMU could 
be considered incremental.  
From this standpoint, the One Market, One Money  Report acknowledged that EMU could have an 
additional impact on specific areas, especially corporate and capital income taxation. In the field of 
corporate income tax, besides stressing the case for harmonization of the tax base and for a minimum rate 
as proposed in the same year by the Ruding Report, and for tax neutrality with respect to cross border 
investment along the lines of the Commission Communication on company taxation in 1990 (SEC(90) 
601), the report anticipated some of the themes which are currently debated by envisaging that the 
corporate income tax could become one of the Community's own resources or, as an alternative, that  a 
fixed apportionment scheme could be used to allocate the tax base among member States. In the field of 
capital income the report advocated a Community solution - which anticipated in some respects the “Tax 
                                                 
4 Ultimately the political and legal processes are mainly driven by structural and institutional changes in 
the underlying economy which have been very significant in all respects. In our view the most important 
have been: (1) the creation of the internal market and the EMU, which have greatly increased trade 
between member countries, fostered the development of single financial market and enhanced capital 
mobility across Europe; (2) globalisation which has increased competition in goods and factor markets 
and potentially shifted the nature of exposures to external shocks; (3) ageing which is putting pressure on 
social security and health systems and, as a consequence, on the fiscal wedge on labour; (4) the 
enlargement of the EU.    21
Package” (see below) - either through the adoption of common reporting rules or through the 
establishment of a minimum withholding tax.  
The One Market, One Money  Report was sanguine regarding the effects of tax competition:  
“the need for harmonization or centralization is limited to certain categories of taxes which account for a 
relatively small part of government revenues: in particular, neither income taxes nor social security 
contributions need to be harmonized, while for VAT rates, only a reduction in cross country differences is 
warranted.” (Emerson, 1990, p. 130). 
There was only a brief reference to the possibility that the loss of the nominal exchange rate could lead 
governments to rely on tax instruments to influence the real exchange rate, but the problem was not 
further elaborated. 
In the build up to the introduction of the Euro, the general approach of the Emerson Report, i.e. that EMU 
did  not raise any major additional tax issues over and above those entailed by the Internal Market, 
remained the basic stance taken by both policy makers and external commentators. To be sure, tax issues 
became a much greater concern in the general policy debate within the EU but the differentiation of 
EMU-specific tax issues from those of the Internal Market more generally were often difficult to discern. 
For example, the approach towards tax competition changed quite noticeably in the middle of the 90’s. In 
1996, following the proposal made by the Commission at the informal meeting of Economics and Finance 
Ministers (ECOFIN) at Verona, a period of intensive discussions among EU Member States began, which 
lead eventually to the so-called “Tax package” (Cattoir, 2006). The Commission document argued that 
tax competition was bringing about the fiscal degradation of the structure of tax system by shifting the tax 
burden to the less mobile tax base – labour – in order to recover the tax lost from the erosion of other 
more mobile bases, mainly capital.  
The document voiced a widespread concern that the high tax burden on labour was one of the main 
reasons for the rising level of unemployment in Europe and for the rising share of the underground 
economy (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). The document endorsed also a much stronger view on the need of 
substantial harmonization in the field of capital taxation “The diversity of national tax regimes for capital 
income, and particularly the generally favourable treatment given to interest paid to non-resident, 
produces economic distortions both within and between Member States, non compatible with the notion 
of a single capital market within the EU.” p. 5 
 
3.1  Capital mobility  
There are many reasons for believing that the mobility of financial capital and the 
location and investment decisions of companies have been affected by the introduction 
of the Euro and that this “deeper” integration influenced certain types of tax change and 
affected the channels through which tax policy influences economic decisions.  
3.1.1  Financial Markets  
Hardouvelis et al. (2006) suggest three potential dimensions specific to the introduction 
of the Euro that may have enhanced capital mobility within the Euro area. 
Firstly, the creation of the Euro zone was preceded by a gradual regulatory 
harmonization among European financial markets, including the development of a   22
common payment and settlement system, and by the abolition of various restrictions on 
non-residents, including in some instances the vestiges of capital controls (Licht 1997). 
It was also preceded by a concerted effort among EU countries to satisfy the Maastricht 
criteria for joining the Eurozone amongst one of which was the “nominal convergence” 
of inflation and long-term interest rates toward German levels
5.  
Secondly, the introduction of the Euro improved transparency, standardized pricing in 
financial markets, and reduced investors' transaction and information costs. Moreover, it 
removed various legal restrictions within the EU on the foreign currency composition of 
assets held by institutional investors, like pension funds and life insurance companies. 
The market expectations before the advent of the monetary union may well be affected 
by the broadening of investment opportunities across the EMU countries. As a 
consequence the integration of European stock markets may have increased as the 
probability of the formation of a monetary union gained strength (Danthine et al. 2000). 
Finally, the introduction of a single currency, coupled with the nominal and real 
convergence just outlined, should have led to a more homogeneous valuations of 
equities in EMU countries and a reduction of the “home bias” by eliminating the intra-
European currency risk. To the extent that currency risk was priced, the overall 
exchange rate exposure of European stocks was reduced. (Danthine et al. 2001, De 
Santis et al. 2006, Fidora et al. 2006, Fratzscher 2002, Galati and Tsatsaronis 2003, 
Hartmann et al. 2003, Lane 2006, Pagano and von Thadden 2004).  
There are several potential linkages between the heightened mobility of savings in the 
Euro area for both the impact of taxes and for the setting of tax policy. For example, the 
                                                 
5 The effort to satisfy the Maastricht criteria also led to better-balanced fiscal budgets, which may have 
led to a "real convergence" of European economies, that is, an increased synchronization in business 
cycles across the European economies.   23
presence of a wide range of tax sensitive foreign investors in domestic financial markets 
may also change the nature of domestic tax policy formulation, particularly in bond 
markets. Withholding taxes on interest payments to non-residents have often been 
revised in the face of heightened capital mobility because of the distortions to which 
they can give rise. The abolition of withholding tax in the US was largely triggered by 
the inability of the US authorities to hinder inflows through tax favoured channels. In 
the late 1990s foreign market participants in the Italian government bond market argued 
strongly for a change in the nature of the withholding tax regime on government bonds 
on the grounds that reimbursement of tax withheld under the existing double taxation 
agreements was cumbersome and uncertain. In order to achieve “nominal convergence” 
this “risk premium” should be eliminated. As a result Italy shifted from withholding tax 
at source (i.e. on individual coupons at the payment date and the pricing of bonds on a 
net of accrued tax basis) to exemption from withholding for all domestic corporate 
entities and foreign investors from treaty countries. Domestic and international paying 
agents were entrusted for withholding accrued tax on all other investors
6. Violi (2004) 
argues that in the build up to the introduction of the Euro the tax-exempt status afforded 
to foreign investment was an important factor in fostering convergence in bond yields 
across Europe; such status has removed the distortion implied by double taxation on 
interest income and has contributed substantially to a more level playing field in Euro 
area financial markets. 
As regards stock markets, heightened capital mobility may have resulted in changes in 
the “marginal investor”, i.e. the investor affecting the prices of assets in markets. There 
                                                 
6 Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1998) discuss the convergence of yields on Italian government bonds in 
the period immediately preceding the introduction of the Euro   24
is considerable evidence suggesting that the behaviour of “marginal investors” is 
determined by the institutional characteristics of markets (Allen and Michaely, 2003) 
and that existing pricing relationships have changed in line with market practices, 
participation and regulatory restrictions (Lasfer, 2007). Foreign participation in markets 
is also associated with a greater volume of arbitrage activity on ex-dividend days 
Liljeblom, and Felixson (2004), In the case of the Euro, a recent study by Simonetta 
(2007) suggests that the dividend payout behaviour of Euro-area companies changed 
following the introduction of the Euro with companies having higher “free float” 
becoming more reactive to the implicit tax rates associated with price changes on ex-
dividend dates. He interprets this result as due to the decline in the “risk premium” and 
the greater presence of international price sensitive investors. 
3.1.2  Foreign direct investment  
Monetary integration may affect FDI through different channels. First, monetary 
integration reduces macroeconomic uncertainty by removing exchange rate volatility, 
declining and stabilizing inflation, reducing price dispersion across members. It also 
increases transparency and credibility of rules and policies. These effects are important 
since the greater the economic and political uncertainty, the more likely the firm will 
wait before entering the market. Indeed, uncertainty about future returns may deter 
irreversible investments as there is an ‘option value’ of waiting (Dixit and Pyndick, 
1994).  
Second, by removing intra-Euroland exchange rate volatility, monetary integration 
increases the certainty-equivalent value of expected profits of risk-averse firms and 
should foster overall FDI. Moreover, this removal of volatility reduces trade costs and 
may favour vertical FDI insofar as firms fragment their production and locate their   25
activities in different countries according to international differences in factor prices. 
However, if foreign investment is a way to serve foreign markets (horizontal FDI), a 
removal of exchange rate volatility may decrease FDI and increase trade as a substitute.  
Finally, a single currency could promote FDI by easing comparison of international 
costs and price decisions and by reducing transaction costs, such as currency conversion 
costs and in-house costs of maintaining separate foreign currency expertise (Bloningen, 
2005, Crowley and Lee, 2003, Goldberg and Kolstad, 1994, Jeanneret 2007, Kiyota and 
Urata, 2004, Pain, 2002). 
The literature on the determinants of the interactions between foreign direct investment 
decisions and taxation is wide ranging. There is growing evidence that differences in 
statutory rates affect the multinationals decision on where to locate new plants and 
where to report profits (Gordon and Hines 2002). However, the focus of this paper, 
namely whether changes in exchange rate regimes or the creation of common currency 
areas affected the impact of tax policy on decision making has not been examined. To 
be sure, a recent paper by Petroulas (2007) using balance of payment data suggests that 
the introduction of the Euro raised inward FDI flows by approximately 16% within the 
Euro area, by approximately 11% to non-members and weakly by around 8% from non-
member countries into the Euro area.  
Currency stability within the Euro area may also have affected intra-group financial 
policies and specifically profit shifting behaviour to lower taxed jurisdictions within the 
Euro area. There is much evidence that intra-company profit-shifting increased 
significantly in the late 1990s. For example, Altshuler and Grubert (2005) 
Weichenrieder (1996) and Huizinga et al. (2008) suggest that many transactions may 
have been redirected between European countries to take advantage of specific tax   26
provisions to minimise the global burden of multinationals. However, these shifts have 
been the result of changes in taxation that cannot be associated directly with EMU and 
in some cases relate to changes in tax provisions of non-EU countries (for example, the 
treatment of “hybrid” entities in the United States has facilitated tax planning strategies 
between related parties). 
3.2  Strategic tax setting 
The increased mobility of tax bases may have enhanced the interdependence of national 
tax policies leading to tax competition. Indeed, there is overwhelming anecdotal 
evidence that governments decisions on domestic tax issues are often affected by the 
choices of foreign countries (Simmons 2006 reports some examples). However, this 
type of evidence is not sufficient to answer more specific questions like “did strategic 
interdependence increase as a result of higher economic integration?” or “are countries 
changing their tax system because policies abroad are more conducive to better resource 
allocation?”
7.  
In the last decade several studies have tackled this issue highlighting the difficulty in 
devising tests which can provide strong statistical evidence of strategic behaviour. 
Besides specific statistical issues which are discussed in Brueckner (2003), the main 
problem every study faces is to find a strategy to disentangle the effects of common 
movements of exogenous explanatory variables of tax policies from the strategic 
reactions to the choices made by foreign governments.  
An illustrative example is provided by the evolution of statutory tax rates on corporate 
income. Since the 80s there is a clear convergence of statutory tax rates and a reduction 
                                                 
7 For example, lower tax rates with base broadening may be an attempt to attract foreign investment or 
create a more level playing field among domestic companies (see below).    27
in their mean value. The dynamics of the statutory rates are not entirely reflected in the 
evolution of the marginal tax rate on investments as the rate cuts have been usually 
coupled with a widening of the tax base. Therefore, it cannot be taken as prima facie 
evidence of a “race to the bottom” for attracting investment. The convergence in 
statutory rates is consistent with the theoretical prediction that increased economic 
integration of capital stimulates strategic interaction forcing high tax countries to reduce 
their rates in order to avoid profit shifting towards low tax countries and to attract new 
multinational firms.  
The problem is to weight this explanation with competing ones. One alternative is 
suggested by the view that the corporate tax is a backstop to the income tax (Gordon 
and MacKie Mason 1995). When the corporate tax rate is lower than the tax rate on 
personal income the burden of the income tax could be reduced by retaining earnings 
within a corporation or by reclassifying labour and interest income as business income. 
The size of the gain from such strategies depends on a number of factors, such as the 
effective tax rates on capital gains, the degree of integration between corporate and 
personal income tax, the structure and burden of social security contributions. In any 
case, there is empirical evidence which confirms that taxpayers do react to differences 
in rates (see Weichenrieder 2005 for a survey). If the corporate tax is a backstop to the 
income tax corporate tax rates are related to personal tax rates on labour and capital 
income and trends in corporate tax rates can be driven by changes in personal taxation.  
The trend in top individual tax rates in Table 4 is consistent with this interpretation as it 
is similar to the one depicted in Table 5 for corporate tax rate: since the 80s tax rates 
converge to a lower mean value.    28
Further evidence of the link between corporate and individual tax rates is provided by 
Slemrod (2004) and Clausing (2007). Obviously, simple correlation does not tell us 
anything about causality. It is possible that higher mobility of profits and firms forced a 
convergence in statutory tax rates and this caused a similar convergence in individual 
rates. But causality may well go in the opposite direction. The trend towards flatter 
income taxes (with smaller tax brackets and lower top rates), illustrated in section 2, 
was certainly driven, at least in the 80s, by the growing concern about the negative 
effect of highly progressive rates on labour supply. Furthermore, as shown by Fuest and 
Weichenrieder (2002) in many OECD countries the decrease in top personal rates on 
capital income has been larger than the decrease in corporate rate and is certainly related 
to a widespread tendency to abandon comprehensive income taxation and to introduce 
separate schedular taxation for interest and/or dividend income.  
Summing up, to the extent that the corporate tax is a backstop to personal income 
taxation, the correlation among corporate tax rates of different countries can be the 
result of common trends in tax rates on personal income.  
Another view is that countries are not engaged in tax competition but in yardstick 
competition. According to this view, countries try to mimic each other’s tax policy to 
seek the votes of informed voters (Besley and Case, 1995). More simply it is also 
arguable that the lowering and convergence of statutory tax rates across countries 
merely reflect a convergence in economic structures and/or dominant economic thinking 
(Slemrod, 2004). According to these positions the reduction in statutory rates 
accompanied by the a widening of the tax base – a widespread phenomenon in the late 
1980s and early 1990s following the US Tax Reforms – was due to the opinion that it 
was conducive to a more neutral tax environment.    29
Among European countries, an additional source of correlation in corporate tax rates 
cuts, which is usually overlooked by the literature, is the general switch from full 
integration between corporate and personal taxes towards double taxation of dividend 
income at (usually) reduced rates. The disappearance of the imputation system is related 
to the more general move towards schedular taxation of capital income. The debate on 
the dual income tax in the Nordic countries has highlighted several reasons for such a 
change. Among the most relevant, it is the increasing awareness that non linear taxation 
of capital income is untenable in well developed capital markets (Alworth 1998). 
However, the dismissal of the full imputation system was catalyzed by the decisions of 
the European Court of Justice and by the action of the European Commission which 
developed the view that the imputation system, by discriminating foreign investors, is 
not consistent with the EU Treaty. It is likely that the extra revenue from the removal of 
the tax credit related to imputation has been compensated, at least in part, by a reduction 
in the corporate tax.
8  
Bearing in mind the previous caveats, it is useful to survey the main results of a small 
number of papers which provide empirical test for strategic interaction in corporate 
taxes. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) investigate the interaction between corporation 
tax revenues as a proportion of GDP among OECD countries between 1968 and 1999. 
Devereux et al. (2002) test whether OECD countries compete with each other over 
statutory and effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on corporate income using data from 
1982 to 1999. Besley et al. (2001) analyze the interdependence in setting average rates 
                                                 
8 Germany (2001), Finland (2005), France (2004), Ireland (1999), Italy (2004), Portugal, UK (1999) have 
all moved from imputation to partial exemption or (modified) classical system. In Germany, Italy, and the 
UK, higher personal taxation of dividend income has been explicitly linked to reductions in corporate 
income tax rates.   30
for five different taxes in the OECD between 1965 and 1997. Finally, Redoano (2007) 
examines the interaction in statutory corporate tax rates among European countries in 
the period 1970-1999.  
All papers find evidence of strategic interaction among countries. In particular, the tests 
performed by Devereux et al. (2002) and Redoano (2007) support the hypothesis that 
countries compete in statutory rates in order to attract profits, while Devereux et al. 
(2002) rejects the hypothesis of strategic interaction in EMTR for attracting investment. 
However the evidence on the relationship between economic integration and strategic 
interaction is somewhat puzzling. Besley et al. (2001) find that interdependence is 
higher the more mobile tax base is. Further they find higher interdependence amongst 
EU countries than between EU and non-EU countries. In contrast, Redoano (2007) 
shows that competition appears to be higher among non-EU countries; EU members 
seem to compete mainly among themselves, but with less intensity. Altshuler and 
Goodspeed (2002) find that interaction among EU countries has become weaker over 
time. At first, these findings may seem to contrast with the theory which suggests that 
market integration should enhance strategic interaction in tax policies. Nonetheless, it 
should be borne in mind that market integration has two different effects. First, it 
increases capital mobility and makes each government revenues more dependent on the 
tax rates of neighbour countries. Second, it widens the size of the world capital market 
making each single country relatively small. This reduces the interdependence among 
fiscal policies.  
3.3  Tax policy, exchange rate adjustments and trade balance 
One of the most significant implications of the single currency is that individual EMU 
countries can no longer rely on nominal exchange rate adjustments. The consequences   31
for domestic tax policies of the change in exchange rate regime can be evaluated from 
both a positive and normative framework. 
In an ideal setting with perfectly competitive markets and flexible prices, the change in 
regime would have no implications for tax policies as any change in the nominal 
exchange rate would be offset by a suitable adjustment in the domestic price level 
leaving the real exchange rate unaffected. When some prices are rigid or sticky, the 
short run impact of tax policy and the adjustment process to the new long run 
equilibrium will be in general different under flexible or fixed nominal exchange rate. 
This is illustrated by the well known Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy, 
where a fiscal expansion increases the equilibrium level of domestic income under fixed 
exchange rates, while it translates into an exchange rate appreciation with no real 
consequences on equilibrium income under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The literature has seldom analysed the impact of domestic tax reforms on the nominal 
exchange rate, the capital account and the ensuing adjustment of the trade balance. One 
study in this vein is Sinn (1985) who argued that the accelerated tax depreciation regime 
introduced in 1981 in the United States was the driving force behind the investment 
boom in that country, high world interest rates, the strength of the US Dollar, and the 
US trade deficit at the beginning of the eighties. The mechanism envisaged by Sinn was 
the following. The introduction of the accelerated tax depreciation reduced the effective 
marginal tax on capital invested in United States and drove the post tax return on 
investment above the pre-tax interest rate. This difference triggered a capital inflow into 
United States which in turn brought about an exchange rate appreciation and a current 
account deficit. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the cut in the effective marginal tax 
would eventually lead to the same current account deficit. But the mechanism would be   32
different. The increase in net imports would be driven by the increase in domestic 
income brought about by the capital inflow.  
The longer term consequences of tax policies on exchange rates have also been 
examined in a neoclassical monetary growth model by Kimbrough (1984). He shows 
that a cut in the corporation income tax rate may have almost any impact on the various 
balance of payments accounts even if, as a practical matter, a cut in the corporation 
income tax rate is likely to lead to an improvement of the capital account and 
deterioration of the current and service accounts. The trade account may either improve 
or deteriorate depending on the magnitudes of the rate of growth of the domestic 
population and the world real interest rate. A reduction in the corporation income tax 
rate results in a one-shot appreciation of the domestic currency even if the steady-state 
rate of depreciation will be unaffected.  
Similar complications to transmission mechanisms were also considered in passing by 
Meade (1978a) and subsequently examined in greater detail by Meade (1978b) who 
looked at the impact on the structure of interest rates and the trade balance from a 
unilateral shift from an income tax to an expenditure tax. In particular Meade noted that 
if one country followed an income tax and the other adopted an expenditure tax, under 
certain types of expenditure tax regimes the global interest rate level could be 
undetermined with potential implications for exchange rates.  
From a normative perspective, where the nominal exchange rate is consider as a policy 
instrument, the introduction of the single currency raises the issue of whether domestic 
taxes may be used to affect the trade balance. This question has been largely neglected 
both in the debate which preceded EMU and in the economic literature that has 
discussed the economic consequences of Euro. This is rather surprising since, as noted   33
by Calmfors (1998), the variations of social security contributions paid by employers is 
one of the most direct substitute for nominal exchange changes. In particular, in the 
short run with fixed nominal wages, a cut in social security contributions paid by 
employers lowers the labour cost relative to foreign prices measured in domestic 
currency in the same way as a nominal exchange-rate devaluation (Calmfors, 1993). If 
the government budget is kept balanced by raising the tax burden on workers and 
households or by reducing public expenditure, there are no direct effects on aggregate 
demand and the final outcome is a devaluation of the real exchange rate. The similarity 
between an “external” and an “internal” exchange rate devaluation is most clear when 
the reduction in social security contributions is financed by an increase in taxes on 
labour income such as a employee contributions, personal income tax, or VAT. 
Employees will experience in both cases a loss in purchasing power in terms of imports. 
At the same time, to the extent that lower labour costs are reflected in lower prices for 
domestically produced commodities, the purchasing power in terms of domestic goods 
will remain unchanged.  
A mechanism similar to the internal depreciation can be found in the so called “EMU 
buffer funds” set up in Finland at the end of the nineties through an agreement among 
the central organizations of the social partners - with support from the government. The 
basic idea of the buffers is that during good times, employers and employees pay 
slightly higher social security contributions than necessary - with the result that, during 
bad times, increases in these contributions can be controlled by using the buffer fund for 
paying social security costs. In theory the funds could be use to actively stabilise the 
economy, i.e. lower the social security contribution in a recession and raise them again 
in a boom. The agreement by the social partners on the funds does not mention this   34
possibility but does not exclude it either. A cut in social security contribution financed 
by the buffer funds will produce an expansionary effect larger than a nominal 
depreciation because of the increase in aggregate demand.  
Some additional insights on the impact of domestic taxes on the trade balance are also 
provided by the literature which has developed from a longstanding controversy on 
VAT. The debate is rooted in the United States where it is commonly argued that the 
border tax adjustment for VAT on exports places foreign countries (notably the 
European countries) at an unfair competitive advantage in world markets relative to the 
United States which are more reliant on the corporate income tax
9.  
From a theoretical perspective the literature has reached an almost unanimous 
consensus on the conclusion that a uniform VAT, whether destination- or origin-based, 
is irrelevant to trade behaviour under a number of assumptions (Keen and Sayd, 2006). 
A uniform destination based VAT taxes all final goods which are consumed 
domestically at the same effective rate regardless of whether there are produced 
domestically or abroad. As a consequence VAT does not distort the choice between 
domestically produced and foreign commodities, and does not affect the intertemporal 
distribution of production and consumption.  
However, the irrelevance of VAT to trade rests on the assumption of uniform rates 
across all consumption goods. Apart from the case where a discriminatory rate is set on 
foreign produced goods there are several cases where rates differ significantly across 
goods. The first one is given by several (mainly) non-tradeable goods and services 
which are exempted by law (such as financial intermediation, education and transports, 
                                                 
9 In the United States the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) and its successor FISC were 
created with the objective of offsetting the adverse competitive effects of corporate tax. These regimes 
were found contrary to GATT rules.   35
or activities which are exempted because their turnover is below a given threshold) or 
exempted because they operate in the informal economy or taxed at a lower rates (e.g. 
foodstuffs). In this case, as noted by Krugman and Feldstein (1989) the VAT will tend 
to decrease the size of the tradable sector and hence the export intensity of countries. 
The second exception occurs when producers do not receive the right refunds for their 
exports. Refunding of credits is the “Achilles heel” of the VAT. Several OECD 
countries have detected significant tax frauds related to the credit refund. This has led 
some countries to introduce complex administrative measures that may significantly 
undermined the functioning of the VAT system (Harrison and Krelove 2005). In the 
absence of a correct refund VAT may work either as an export tax (if the credit is 
limited) or as an export subsidy (in the case of an undue refund). Finally, tax rates may 
vary across time. A fully anticipated increase in VAT lowers the real return on savings 
leading consumer to anticipate consumption to avoid the higher tax in the future. As a 
consequence a fully anticipated rise in VAT brings about a deterioration of the trade 
balance which is financed through an inflow of capital from abroad.  
More recently, a small number of papers had tried to test the theoretical predictions by 
the  empirical analysis of the effect of domestic taxes on trade balance. Desai and Hines 
(2005) have considered the impact of the VAT on export and trade intensity. Their 
results are somewhat mixed (at least for high-income countries): in the presence of fixed 
effects, a simple dummy representing the presence or absence of a VAT has no effect on 
either export or trade intensity. The share of VAT in total tax revenue, however, is 
significantly and negatively related to both. As regards the trade impact of the corporate 
tax, Slemrod (2004) finds a significant positive association between corporate tax 
revenues relative to GDP and trade intensity. In a far more ambitious study, Keen and   36
Sayd (2006) partly confirm these results. They find that increased reliance on VAT 
revenue tends to be associated with a sharp reduction in net exports, which quickly 
fades. The results also point, however, to powerful and complex effects from the 
corporate tax. Increases in corporate taxation—whether measured by revenues or the 
statutory rate—are associated with sharp short-run increases in net exports (consistent 
with induced capital flows abroad); these are then subsequently and quickly reversed 
(consistent with increased income from investments abroad), leaving an increase in net 
exports that converges to zero. 
4  The impact of EMU on the main functions of the tax system  
To what extent higher capital mobility, tax competition and the change of the exchange 
rate regimes had triggered a change in the tax systems in the Euro area? The discussion 
of the previous section has highlighted several potential linkages between these factors 
and the tax policies. In this section we will focus on three issues: a) whether higher 
capital mobility brought about a shift of the tax burden from capital to labour b) whether 
it caused a reduction in tax progressivity c) whether domestic tax reforms were driven 
by the aim of achieving an internal devaluation.   
The first two issues are relevant as they represent the major concerns on fiscal policy at 
the time of the introduction of Euro. As discussed in Box 1, the fear that the integration 
of capital market could lead to a shift of the tax burden from capital to labour was 
fuelled by a stunning consistency between the theory and the empirical evidence 
available at that time. Revenues from capital income and statutory rates on corporate 
income appeared to be on a sharp downward trend in existing member countries and a 
number of (relatively small) accession countries were proceeding to adopt very low 
rates of corporate tax.    37
In contrast, the third issue has been largely neglected but may become a relevant matter 
in the near future as some members of the Eurozone have recently sought to implement 
changes in the tax mix which may substitute for devaluations of the nominal exchange 
rate in the attempt to stimulate the growth without breaching the Growth and Stability 
Pact. 
4.1  Has capital market integration shifted the tax burden from capital to 
labour? 
A central result in the theory of optimal taxation is that source-based taxes on capital 
income are inefficient instruments with which to raise revenue in a small open 
economy. Under perfect capital mobility a small open economy faces a perfectly elastic 
supply of capital. Any source-based tax on capital will bring about an outflow of capital 
which drives up the pre-tax return and decreases the marginal productivity of other 
immobile domestic productive factors. As a result the burden of the tax is fully borne by 
the immobile factors, e.g. labour, which must accept a lower compensation. It is clearly 
more efficient to tax the immobile factors directly, preventing the fall in productivity, 
rather than indirectly via the capital tax. Insofar as the voting process forces 
governments to implement Pareto efficient tax policies, the theory predicts a gradual 
decline of capital income taxes, and a parallel increase in taxes on labour, as capital 
markets integrate.  
In fact, these trends are evident in the eighties and mid nineties when considering the 
implicit tax rates on capital and labour for the EU-15 and EU-12 which are reported in 
graph 2.    38
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However, quite surprisingly, the same graph shows that these trends were somewhat 
reversed in the last decade. Why did capital income taxation not decline further as 
predicted by the theory? 
The first possible explanation is that tax competition has brought about a change in the 
structure of capital income taxation, with a shift from source-based to residence-based 
taxes. There is no reason for a small open economy to give up residence-based capital 
taxation provided it has sufficient information to tax foreign investments by its 
residents. However, there is no clear evidence of such a change in the data. We should 
observe, for example, a gradual dismissal of the main source-based tax, namely the 
corporation tax. But despite the sharp decline in statutory tax rates, shown in table 5, 
corporate tax revenues relative to GDP remained stable or even increased in most   39
OECD countries (Sorensen, 2007).
 10 Furthermore, as highlighted by Devereux et al 
(2002) no clear trend can be detected in EMTRs, as the cuts in statutory rates went 
along with reductions in investment-related deductions.  
A number of papers have tried to solve the “puzzle” of the surviving corporate tax. It is 
important to distinguish the problem of the stability of revenue from that of the stability 
of the EMTRs. The first reason is that the EMTRs can be driven down to zero without 
repealing the corporate tax, by exempting the normal return to capital. This can be 
achieved either through a cash-flow tax or by allowing the deduction of the opportunity 
cost of equity (as in the ACE proposal) or capital (as in the BEIT proposal) invested in 
the firm. In this case the tax base is given by the pure risk premium on capital invested 
in the company and by any return in excess to the normal return to capital which may 
stem from the exploitation of a scarce natural resource or by advantages due to a 
particular location (low input cost or conglomeration effects) and can be certainly 
positive. The second reason is that changes in revenue actually collected may be driven 
not only by tax reforms but also by several factor which affect the tax base.  
In order to disentangle the different variable which affects corporate revenue Sorensen 
(2007) analyses a useful decomposition of the ration between the corporate tax and 
GDP: 
R/GDP = (R/C)(C/P)(P/GDP) 
which shows that an  increase in the ratio of corporate taxes (R) on GDP may be due to 
an increase of the average effective tax burden on corporate sector (R/C), an increase in 
                                                 
10 Steward and Webb (2006) analyse  the evolution of corporate tax burdens – measured as corporate tax 
collected on GDP and on total taxes – in the OECD countries between 1950 and 1999. Descriptive 
analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate 
taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden.   40
the share of total profits accruing to the corporate sector (C/P) or, eventually, to an 
increase in the share of profits (P) in GDP. Sorensen (2007) calculated such 
decomposition for a number of OECD countries back to the early 1980s. The data show 
that the changes in revenue over GDP are mainly driven by the first two factors, given 
that the profit share of GDP is almost stable over the period. There is no clear tendency 
of the average effective tax rate to decline over time. As for EMTR this may be the 
result of the base broadening reforms which had offset the sharp reduction in statutory 
rates.  
For the U.S., Auerbach (2006) noticed that an additional factor which may have 
contributed to raise the average effective rate in recent years is an unprecedented 
increase in profit volatility. Given the asymmetry of the tax system, which does not 
provide for an immediate compensation or tax credit in case of losses, the average tax 
rate on net corporate profits had increased substantially simply because a larger 
proportion of firms were experiencing losses. Unfortunately, there is no evidence on 
whether this phenomenon is widespread internationally. 
However, the most clear and interesting trend is given by the rise in the ratio between 
profits in the corporate sector and total profits. This may reflect both a growing 
divergence in profitability between the corporate sector and the rest of the economy or 
an increasing preference for the corporate organizational form. In part the growing 
importance of incorporated firms may be due to structural transformation of the 
economy such as the decline of sectors with a higher intensity of non-corporate firms, 
e.g. agriculture. But it may also reveal important side effects of tax competition. In 
closely held corporations, entrepreneurs may usually choose to receive a large part of 
their compensation as salary or profit. To the extent that the decline in corporate rates   41
has reduced the effective tax burden on profit relative to labour income, there should be 
a reduction in the personal income tax base and an increase in corporate profits. The 
growth in corporate profits may also reflect higher incentive to defer taxes on capital 
income by reducing interest payments (Fuest and Weichenrieder, 2002). 
A second type of income shifting occurs through the choice of legal form of companies. 
Entrepreneurs face a choice between a (closely held) corporation and other legal forms 
of doing business, such as the (sole) proprietorship or partnerships. Lower corporate tax 
rates may have induced them to switch to the corporate form, which then broadens the 
corporate tax base. Using a panel of European data Mooij, de and Nicodème (2007) 
have found a large and significant effect of lower corporate tax rates on incorporation 
choices. Their simulations suggest that between 12% and 21% of corporate tax revenue 
can be attributed to income shifting and that income shifting have raised the corporate 
tax-to-GDP ratio by some 0.25%-points since the early 1990s. This reconciles, albeit in 
part, the empirical evidence with theory. As predicted by the theory it seems that tax 
competition is driving down the tax burden on capital income but, given the optimal 
response of taxpayers, aimed at reducing the overall tax bill, the revenue loss shows up 
in personal taxation of business income rather than corporate tax as expected. This 
behaviour is in accordance with the results of the simple regressions in the previous 
section, which documented an increase in corporate tax revenues and a fall in individual 
income taxes after the introduction of Euro. 
Other forms of change in organisational form may also have contributed to the stability 
of corporate tax and has been apparently neglected by the literature. A share of 
corporate tax revenue may simply stems from the reallocation of revenue in the public 
sector. The main example is given by privatization. In many countries (e.g. United   42
Kingdom, see Florio, 2004) State owned enterprises were not responsible to pay 
company taxes (Mintz et. al. 2000). But even in the case where they did pay corporate 
taxes, the privatization process usually leads to higher profit and higher tax revenues. 
Overall, the large scale privatizations of the nineties may then explain a significant 
share of corporate tax revenue. Another example of revenue reallocation is given by 
countries with large natural resources which may have changed the classification of 
revenue. This is illustrated by the United Kingdom with reference to revenues from oil 
and gas production. The graph 3 shows that the corporate income tax has gradually 
replaced the royalty payment and part of the petroleum revenue tax.  
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Source: HM Revenue & Customs   http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/table11_11.pdf 
 
Finally mention should be made of changes in organisational form associated with 
‘demutualisation’. This change is most apparent in the case of UK building societies   43
which were largely transformed into companies in the 1990s but similar phenomena 
have occurred in continental companies. 
It is more difficult to find consistent explanations for the relative stability of EMTRs. 
Ex-post changes in the tax bases and taxpayers’ behavioural responses cannot account 
for variations in the EMTRs as the latter are ex-ante measures of the tax burden on 
investment based on tax provisions rather than company data.  
A first reason for the survival of positive source-based EMTRs may be found in the 
nature of foreign direct investments (FDI). It is well know that most FDI is in the form 
of M&A. Brakman et al. (2006) calculate that 78% of all FDI, in value term, are M&A 
while greenfield investment account for just 22% of total FDI value. Within M&A, 97% 
of deals are acquisitions. Further, the share of M&As have risen sharply in the last 
decades as shown by Calderon (2004). While it is clear that a reduction in EMTR 
increases the net return on capital and makes the country more attractive for greenfield 
investment, the effect on the probability of a takeover by foreign company is less 
obvious. To the extent that taxes on income are capitalized in the value of the assets a 
reduction in EMTR will increase the value of domestic companies leaving unchanged 
the net return that a foreign company may earned through a take-over. This suggests 
that the existing literature may overstate the case for the inefficiency of source-base 
capital income taxation by focusing on the case of greenfield investment.
11  
A second reason which may explain why small countries choose to levy a source-based 
tax on capital is related to redistribution. The argument against capital taxation in a open 
economy rests on the assumption that governments can optimally tax the immobile 
                                                 
11 For a review of the recent literature and an empirical analysis on the effect of taxes on M&A see 
Huizinga and Voget (2005).   44
factors which ultimately bear the burden on the capital income tax. Notice that when the 
governments wish to affect the distribution of income this is equivalent to assume that 
the government may levy optimal differential lump-sum taxes. In the more sensible 
framework where the government may only levy a linear or a non-linear tax on labour 
income the source-based tax is an efficient tool for redistributing income to the extent 
that the tax is shifted onto the wages of workers with different abilities in different 
proportions (Arachi 2007, Huber 1999). 
4.2  Was there a reduction in tax progression and in the redistribution carried 
out by the tax system? 
Capital market integration and tax competition are alleged to limit redistribution 
because on the one hand it is more difficult for the single country to tax the rich and 
mobile, and on the other redistributive policies may attract poor individuals from 
foreign countries (Feld 2000, Wildasin 2000).  
Tax progression may vary for two different reasons: the revenue composition may 
change, and the progression of each single tax may vary. With reference to the first 
reason, we have shown that there is no clear evidence that EMU has forced a significant 
shift among taxes. This leaves us with the question on whether the progression of the 
PIT tax has been affected by the single currency. We have already noticed that there is a 
general trend among OECD countries towards a reduction of tax brackets and marginal 
tax rates in the PIT. However, these changes in the tax schedule does not allow to 
conclude that the PIT have become less progressive as the shape of the average tax 
function depends on tax allowances and credits.  
One way to evaluate the overall change in progression is to rely on the average personal 
income tax rates on gross labour income calculated by OECD based on the framework   45
used in the OECD publication “Taxing Wages”. The OECD tax database contains data 
since 2000. We took the difference of average tax rates (excluding social security and 
payroll taxes) between 2000 and 2006 for two different types of single earners without 
children: one with income equal to 67% of the income of the average worker (AW) and 
another with income equal to 167% of that of the AW. The changes in tax rates are 
depicted in graph 4. The graph shows some general trends. First, most countries in the 
Eurozone have decreased the average rate on low incomes (exceptions are Austria, 
France and Spain). But at the same time, the majority of countries have decreased the 
average tax rate on high income.  
 
The impact on tax progression can be evaluated through graph 5 where tax progression 
is measured by the ratio between the difference of the average tax rates at 167% of 
average earnings and at 67% of average earnings and the average tax rate at 167%, 
using the formula: (T167-T67)/T167. When an observation lies above the 45 degrees 
line tax progression as increased since 2000. Only three countries (Austria, France, and 
Spain) show a reduction in tax progression while the remaining 9 countries have moved 
toward higher progression.   46
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Source: OECD Taxing Wages database and own calculations 
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Mexico (1.75 in 2000, 1.24 in 2006) has been taken out to improve visibility 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages database and authors’ own calculations   47
However, the most interesting feature of the data is that EMU countries seem to behave 
differently from the rest of OECD countries. On average, non Euro countries have 
reduced the tax progression of the PIT. Albeit preliminary, these findings are suggestive 
that there may be a relationship between capital market integration and the political 
demand for higher tax progression. A possible explanation is provided Arachi and 
D’Antoni (2004). Higher capital mobility reduces the variance in the return for capital 
owners while at the same time increases the wage risk of immobile sector specific 
skilled workers. Redistribution among workers plays an insurance role and makes the 
investment in specific skills more attractive. The insurance effect of redistribution can 
be stronger than the distortionary effect, so that the optimal progression of the labour 
income tax can increase when capital markets become more integrated.  
4.3  Have domestic tax reforms been driven by concerns regarding the relation 
between taxes, international trade and domestic employment? 
To our knowledge there is no empirical study on the impact of domestic taxes on trade 
in the Eurozone. The only limited evidence is provided by some simulations performed 
with the Commission services QUEST model in European Commission (2002). The 
study analyses the effects on the main macroeconomic variables of different 
discretionary fiscal measures for three countries: Germany, Ireland and Greece. The 
simulations show that a permanent tax shift from labour income taxes to VAT may have 
sizeable positive long-run effects on GDP for a large country like Germany, while the 
impact is negligible in the short run and for the small countries, Ireland and Greece. The 
effects on the trade balance, are in general negligible. Only in the long run (three years 
after the policy change) Germany experiences a reduction in net exports. It is not clear, 
however, whether the “tax swap” considered by the Commission can be strictly   48
interpreted as an internal devaluation as the reduction in labour income taxes seems to 
include taxes which are not (at least in the short run) production costs such as those paid 
by the employees.  
Table 7: Taxes and net exports 
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Obs.  695 656 656 656 
R-squared  0.44 0.44 0.48 0.48 
All regressions include countries effects, years effects, per-capita GDP control. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*means significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. 
 
We looked for further empirical evidence by conducting a simple analysis on the 
correlation between the trade balance and current values of domestic taxes on GDP   49
using and unbalanced panel of OECD countries from 1970 to 2005. The results are 
reported on Table 7.
12 
We considered first a very simple specification where net exports in goods and services 
on GDP are regressed on VAT, corporate tax, and total tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP. The estimates (column 1) confirms the main findings of Keen and Sayed (2006): 
export performance is unrelated to reliance on VAT, but positively related to reliance on 
corporate taxes. However, while Keen and Sayed (2006) reports a negative correlation 
between the trade balance an total tax revenues, no significant association can be 
detected in our sample. Column 2 test whether employer social security contributions 
have an impact on the trade balance. The theory on internal devaluation predicts a 
negative association between these two variables. In contrast, the estimated coefficient 
is positive and is not significant. We further explored whether the sensitiveness of trade 
to domestic taxes has changed with the creation of EMU. To this end column 3 uses two 
dummies (the first equal to one for EMU countries up to 1998 and the second equal to 
one for EMU countries for the period 1999-2005) interacted with the tax variables. 
There is no evidence that the association between trade and VAT is different between 
EMU and other OECD countries before and after the introduction of the new currency. 
But, interestingly, there is weak evidence that the single currency has increased the 
responsiveness of net exports to employers social security contributions. Further, the 
estimated coefficient for employer SSC for EMU countries after the introduction of 
Euro has a negative sign as predicted by the theory (column 4). A similar pattern can be 
detected for the corporate income tax. The sensitiveness of trade to the corporate tax is 
                                                 
12 Though not reported, all specifications include country effects, year dummies to control for any 
unobserved common time-specific effects and per-capita GDP. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust.   50
significantly higher for EMU members, and further increases after the introduction of 
Euro. 
The previous conclusions are only provisional. A more sophisticated analysis is needed 
to control for the endogeneity of the tax variables and to detect more complex dynamic 
effects, especially for VAT and corporate taxation. However, with reference to VAT 
and corporate taxes, Keen and Syed (2006) have shown that the results of the simple 
specification in column 1 (no trade effects of VAT, strong short run effects of corporate 
tax) are confirmed by a more general dynamic model. Therefore our regression results 
suggest that the introduction of Euro has increased the responsiveness of trade to 
domestic taxes, in particular the corporate tax and employers social security 
contributions. The association between taxes and trade is consistent with the theory of 
the internal devaluation: a cut in employer tax related costs as a positive effect on net 
exports while an increase in VAT is neutral.
 13  
In the light of this conclusion it appears somewhat surprising that until recently there is 
little evidence that tax reforms have been driven by trade concerns given the potential 
trade effects. Apart from the cases discussed in section 3.3, in the past decades the main 
reforms in the field of social security contributions have actually resulted in an increase 
in employer SSC to finance growing entitlement programmes. To be sure since the 
introduction of the Euro there have been a number of reductions in SSC, but these have 
been, by and large, targeted to specific groups or sectors. A summary analysis of 
changes in VAT and social security contribution revenues as a percentage of GDP did 
                                                 
13 We also tested additional specifications which include SSC paid by employees as a percentage of GDP. 
In the simple regression with no interacted dummies, the estimated coefficient of this variable is negative 
but not significant. Using interacted dummies the regressions shows a significant negative impact on trade 
for countries outside the Eurozone, while the coefficients are still not significant for EMU members, both 
before and after the introduction of EMU, as predicted by the theory of internal devaluation.   51
not reveal any significant correlation. Why did Euro Countries not pursue “internal 
devaluations” more often? 
A first set of reasons, highlighted by Calmfors (1998), stems from political economy 
considerations. The obvious difference between an external and an internal devaluation 
is that the latter requires an explicit political consensus to vary taxes or expenditures 
whereas devaluations are at the discretion of governments or the monetary authorities. 
The quest for a political agreement may find several hurdles in the choice of the tax 
increases or expenditure cuts needed to finance a reduction in employers’ contribution 
since each alternative would have different distributional consequences
14. In the case of 
tax-financed internal devaluations, a VAT increase is not entirely equivalent to an 
increase in employee social security contributions or to a tax on labour. An increase in 
VAT falls on the consumption of all residents. A fully anticipated increase in VAT 
lowers the real return on savings leading consumers to reduce current consumption in 
order to avoid the higher tax in the future and tends to entail a reduction of net exports 
in the short run
15. By contrast, a fully anticipated increase in the tax on employees’ 
labour income does not lead to an immediate impact on consumption and net exports. 
The difficulties related to the political process could be partly overcome if the cut in 
social security contributions is debt financed, as in the case of the Italian reduction of 
IRAP, or through the creation of “buffer funds” as in the case of Finland. However, 
                                                 
14 Besson (2007) argues that the introduction of a Social VAT to replace a part of SSC would not have the 
degree of widespread social consensus that similar measures had in Denmark in the late 1980s and that 
the ideal design from a political standpoint (i.e. reductions in SSC aimed at lower income groups) would 
not necessarily be sufficient to offset foreign competitive pressures 
15 An unanticipated increase in VAT decreases the value of existing assets and leads to a decrease in 
current consumption.   52
these strategies may currently be constrained by the limit set on debt financing by the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
A second set of reasons that may explain why countries have not relied on internal 
devaluations is that the final effects of such a strategy on unemployment are unclear. 
Hoon and Phelps (1996) explore the effects of a shift to an increased VAT offset by 
lighter payroll taxation in a version of the labor-turnover model of unemployment. They 
find that such a shift decreases the natural rate of employment in a closed economy and 
in a two country world, while for a small open economy whose interest rate is given by 
the world rate, the tax shift is neutral for employment. In contrast, Goerke (1999) finds 
that in an efficiency wage model of employment the shift from SSC to VAT has 
uncertain economic consequences which depend on whether VAT is shifted forward 
into consumer prices and on the nature of the employment compensation system. 
Finally, the ambiguity on the employment consequences of a “internal devaluation” is 
also consistent with the fact that despite the widespread concerns on the effect of taxes 
and social security contributions on labour cost the theoretical prediction and the 
empirical evidence are rather mixed (Arpaia e Carone 2004). From a theoretical 
perspective, the incidence of SSC depends on a series of institutional factors such as the 
relative strength of unions, the centralization of the wage bargaining process, the 
structure of product and capital markets, and the interaction of tax with other 
institutions (e.g. the fiscal treatment of unemployment benefits). Furthermore, the 
degree of shifting of social security contributions on labour may also depend on the link 
between the tax payment and the future benefit. If this link is strong and correctly 
perceived by the agents the negative effects of SSC may be significantly alleviated   53
(Butler, 2002, Disney, 2004). This implies that, when there is a link between SSC and 
benefits the shift from SSC to value added taxes increases the tax wedge.
16  
The empirical evidence mirrors the mixed results of the theoretical analysis. The study 
by Arpaia and Carone (2004) suggests that there is probably some wage resistance in 
the short-term but not in the long-term, although the transition to the long-term can be 
very long and therefore the short-term impact and the dynamics of adjustment can be 
longlasting. In the short-term, an increase in the tax wedge has an impact on the labour 
cost and thus on employment, although limited. The estimates suggest that a 1 
percentage point increase in the tax wedge leads to a contemporaneous increase in the 
real labour costs of only 0.1%. 
As mentioned above until recently there has not been much evidence of explicit policies 
directed at achieving an internal devaluation. However, in 2007 Germany increased its 
VAT rate by 3 p.p. to 19% and has reduced at the same time its social security 
contributions for employment from 6.5% to 4.2% 
17. In 2007, Italy cut the tax wedge on 
labour by reducing its value added business tax (Irap). The cut was financed by 
reforming the mandatory severance indemnity scheme (TFR). The reform turned the 
existing fully funded scheme run by individual firms into a pay as you go scheme run 
by the National Social Security Agency (INPS). The additional revenue came from the 
“first generation” effect of the reform. More recently, the proposal of a “social VAT” 
have been hotly debated during the French election campaign and resulted in a 
government report on the feasibility of its introduction (Besson, 2007). 
                                                 
16 This point is acknowledged by European Commission (2002) that observes that the simulated effects of 
an internal devaluation on GDP are larger for Germany than for Ireland and Greece since the indexation 
of benefits to taxes is lower in Germany and consequently labour income taxes are more distortionary. 
17 A similar policy was followed in 1998. In 1987, Denmark introduced a “social VAT”  to calm an 
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5  Tax systems in the EMU: future developments and prospects for reforms 
The wide survey of theory and evidence presented in this paper confirms the difficulties 
to single out some clear links between the introduction of the common currency and the 
evolution of tax system in the Euro area. However there are several interesting 
conclusions that can be drawn.  
First, the data show a clear effect of the adjustment to the Maastricth criteria on total tax 
revenue. Countries joining the Eurozone where characterized by high fiscal pressure but 
their total tax to GDP ratio has increased more than other EU and OECD countries after 
1992. 
Second, most of the concerns that were raised during the build up to monetary union did 
not materialised. In the One Market, One Money  report the Commission took the view 
that the main effect of Euro on tax system would have operate through the increased 
mobility of capital. In the mid of the ‘90ies the Commission voiced the fear that capital 
mobility was bringing about a shift of the tax burden to the less mobile tax base – labour 
– causing in turn high employment and hindering redistribution. The empirical literature 
has confirmed that the common currency has increased both the mobility of financial an 
real capital but there is no clear evidence that this has fostered strategic interaction 
among EMU countries and a decline of capital income taxes, in particular the corporate 
income tax. Furthermore, there are no apparent signs that higher capital mobility is 
jeopardizing the progression of the PIT.  
However, we have highlighted several factors that may have disguised the erosion of 
capital income taxes: income shifting between the personal and the corporate tax bases, 
the privatization process, revenue reallocation in countries with large natural resources, 
changes in organisational form associated with ‘demutualisation’. Further, we have   55
shown that the sensitiveness of the trade balance to corporate taxation has increased in 
the EMU, which may be taken as tentative evidence that capital movements to and from 
Euro area countries have become more responsive to the levels of corporate taxation. As 
a consequence, the case for further corporate tax coordination in the Eurozone should be 
taken up seriously.  
At present one of the main objective of the European Commission in the tax field is to 
provide companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities 
focusing in particular on the Common Consolidated Tax Base (CCTB). The 
Commission strategy is mainly driven by the aim of removing in a systematic way the 
tax obstacles which exist for companies operating in more than one Member State in the 
Internal Market. From this perspective, the CCTB does not raise any obvious problems 
or advantages directly related to EMU. In contrast, it may have relevant consequences 
for tax competition. In the short run such proposal is likely to increase the sensitivity of 
direct investments to national corporate tax rates and may lead to a further decline in tax 
rates and revenues. However, the implementation of a CCTB may provide the basis for 
an effective discipline among EMU countries. Even if the European Commission has 
stated at several occasions that it has no intention to link the CCTB with any proposal to 
harmonize tax rates, it is a fact that the harmonization of the tax base opens the 
possibility of implementing a mutually beneficial minimum level of taxation in the 
Eurozone.  
Finally, the recent experience of the largest EMU countries (Germany, France and Italy) 
suggests that members of the Eurozone are looking for changes in the tax mix which 
may substitute for devaluations of the nominal exchange rate in the attempt to stimulate 
the growth without breaching the Growth and Stability Pact.    56
The prospect that internal devaluations may proliferate in the Eurozone raises a number 
of issues. The first question is whether there is the need to limit national autonomy in 
this field or to coordinate the choices of single member States. If the answer is yes, the 
further question is what kind of coordination could minimize the inefficiency of 
strategic interaction allowing a sufficient degree of national autonomy in the choice of 
the tax mix. 
The history of the EMS leaves little room for arguing against the need to set a limit to 
“beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations. The real issue is which kind of constraint is 
needed. From a theoretical perspective, it is quite hard to find a way to prevent countries 
to affect the real exchange rate through taxes. As explained in the previous section, an 
internal devaluation may be achieved in several ways: the necessary element is only the 
cut in taxes which increase the labour cost. However, in the limited sample of 
significant attempts to pursue such a strategy, the cut in social security contribution paid 
by employers has been financed mainly through an increase in VAT (e.g. the reform 
implemented in Germany and the debate on social VAT in France). Simple 
considerations can explain such behaviour. From the one hand in recent years many 
Euro countries have failed in any attempt to reduce public expenditure. From the other 
hand, a shift of taxation from employers to employees is likely to face a strong political 
opposition on the equity ground. The quest for avoiding competitive internal 
devaluations, leads therefore to analyse the need for further coordination of VAT.  
This is the field where the Commission exerted a strong effort during the 1990s. The 
Commission initiatives were driven by the objective of improving the functioning of the 
internal market. Ever since it adopted its first and second VAT Directives in April 1967, 
the Community has been committed to introducing a “definitive system” of taxation   57
which eliminates import taxes and export tax exemptions in trade between the Member 
States by taxing goods and services in “the Member State of origin” (Bill, 2004). The 
abolition of internal border controls and formalities in 1993, removed one the basis of 
the working of the normal system of destination VAT for intra-EC trade and stimulated 
several proposals for a definitive origin-based VAT system (Keen et al, 1996).  The 
large literature which rapidly developed on the theme provided clear policy guidelines.
18 
Under the origin principle countries have the incentive to set taxes at a level which is 
inefficiently low. The inefficiency of tax competition is larger the wider are the 
differences in country size. Small countries undercut large countries and produce the 
largest tax externalities. The introduction of a minimum tax rate is Pareto improving 
while the welfare effect of harmonization o tax rates is in general ambiguous. Following 
these prescriptions the rules determining the tax base and the procedures for tax 
collection and administration were harmonized to some extent (even if there remain 
significant differences among Member States), the range of statutory rates was reduced 
and minimum statutory rates were set.
19 This has resulted in a convergence of statutory 
tax rates, despite differences persist in the efficiency of tax collection due to national 
derogations and exemptions and to the different size of the informal economy (Mathis, 
2004). 
Is this framework adequate to deal with the possibility of a strategic use of VAT to 
affect the real exchange rate? To answer the question notice first that the transition to 
the origin principle was never completed and that there are no sign that the ‘transitional 
system’ implemented in 1993 is going to be replaced in the near future (Bill, 2004, 
                                                 
18 Lockwood (2001) provides an excellent  synthesis of the theoretical literature. 
19 As explained below, there is also a political commitment on a maximum rate of 25%.    58
Cnossen, 2002). In practice in the ‘transitional system’ the origin principle is applied to 
individual cross-border shopping while the destination principle applies to transactions 
between firms (on a reverse charge basis). Despite the widespread concern that cross 
border shopping may rapidly swell due to the change in regime, the more recent 
evidence suggest that there have been no significant changes in cross-border purchasing 
patterns, nor any significant distortions of competition or deflections of trade through 
disparities in VAT rates (Cnossen, 2002). De facto, VAT still adhere to the destination 
principle both in intra- and extra-EU transaction.  
The fact that European VAT is at present mainly destination-based is crucial for 
understanding the incentives countries may have to manipulate the tax in order to 
increase competitiveness. Under a destination-based VAT an internal devaluation can 
be achieved by increasing the VAT rate and cutting employer SSC. Under the origin 
principle an increase in VAT rate would raise the price of domestically produced 
commodities relative to the price of imports. Therefore in order to achieve a devaluation 
of the real exchange rate under the origin based principle, the VAT rate should be cut 
and the revenue loss should be finance through an increase in taxes on employees.  
The predominance of the destination principle both in intra- and extra-EU transaction  is 
also fundamental to identify the welfare loss due to strategic interaction and possible 
remedies. To the extent that a country succeeds to achieve a welfare improving increase 
in net exports by cutting tax related labour cost and raising destination-based VAT,  it 
will inflict a welfare loss to its trading partners. This implies that a process of 
competitive internal devaluation will lead to VAT rates which are inefficiently high, 
rather than too low as in the case of tax competition under the origin principle. 
Furthermore, if we focus on the welfare of Eurozone countries, the largest damages may   59
be caused by large countries. It is likely that a successful internal devaluation by a small 
country will have a negligible impact on the nominal exchange rate between Euro and 
other currencies. As a consequence, the devaluation of the real exchange rate will hurt 
in the same way trading partners in and outside the Eurozone. In contrast, when the 
same policy is implemented by a large country,  there may be an effect on the nominal 
exchange rate. To the extent that the increase in net exports will trigger an appreciation 
of Euro with respect to the other currencies, Eurozone countries will suffer a greater 
loss of competitiveness.  
These simple considerations suggest three solutions which range from weak to strong 
forms of coordination. The first one is the introduction of a maximum VAT rate. Since 
its original proposal on VAT rates (COM(87)321) the Commission has recommended 
several times the introduction of a maximum rate of 25%, but the Council only agreed 
in 1996 to make "every effort" not to go beyond that level. The problem is that such a 
limit seems too high to be effective: the largest economies (Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain) have rates which are still significantly lower, ranging from 16% to 20%, and 
many of them (France, Italy and Spain) apply a reduced rate on a substantial share of 
the tax base. On the other hand, the implementation of a explicit maximum rate at 20% 
would drastically reduce the national autonomy in this field, leaving a band of 5 
percentage points only. 
The alternative to the maximum rate could be found in the reform of the EU own 
resources. At present, the VAT-based own resource results from the application of a 
uniform rate of call (around 0.33 % in 2007) to a common tax base. This base is a 
theoretical construct that compensates for the fact that neither the VAT rates nor the list 
of goods and services covered by VAT are harmonised at EU level. As a consequence   60
the payment of each member State is not affected by variations in revenue due to 
changes in its own tax bases and rates. In contrast, a tax sharing scheme of actual VAT 
revenues, could be a means to internalize the effect of beggar-thy-neighbour strategies, 
as this would raise the perceived cost of raising revenue through VAT for national 
governments.  
The third solution is given by the transition to the definitive origin-based regime. As 
explained above, in order to decrease the ratio between domestically produced good and 
imports, a country should cut VAT and increase taxes on the income of employees. 
However from one hand tax rates cannot be reduced below the minimum levels already 
set and on the other hand it may be difficult to find the consensus for increasing taxes 
on labour, given that in many countries the tax wedge on labour is quite high. 
It is worthwhile to notice that, even with perfect price flexibility, under the destination 
principle uncoordinated tax setting brings about inefficient equilibria (Arachi, 2001). 
The tax rates are too high and a coordinate reduction in rates on imported goods 
(through a maximum rate) yield a Pareto improvement (Lockwood, 2001). This implies 
that EMU may act as forerunner for a new coordination strategy in VAT field that may 
be later extended to the rest of EU countries. 
6  Conclusions 
Tax policy as such has not been generally seen as raising any specific issues for the 
coming into existence of a common currency. The Euro has not been closely associated 
with changes in tax policy nor has concern been expressed that the domestic tax systems 
of Euro area countries are influencing economic activity in the Euro area relative to 
non-Euro area countries. At the same time tax policy is very actively discussed within 
the European Union.    61
This paper has examined whether and how the introduction of the Euro changed the 
impact of taxes on the economy or influenced the direction of tax policy. The paper 
surveyed potential theoretical channels through which tax policy and exchange rate 
regimes are interrelated (capital mobility, strategic tax setting and trade policy). It is 
difficult to find strong empirical evidence of major, unique changes in the impact or 
determination of tax policy following the introduction of the Euro. The internal market 
has had by far a greater impact and it has affected all European Union countries. 
Nevertheless, we highlighted that going forward certain specific aspects deserve 
attention and call for further tax coordination among EMU and EU countries. The most 
important concerns the use of tax policy by individual EMU countries to improve 
competitiveness by changing the mix of taxes and thereby achieving an internal 
devaluation.  A second issue deserving attention concerns tax competition particularly 
in the area of corporation tax. We provided some tentative evidence that capital 
movements to and from Euro area countries have become more responsive to the levels 
of corporate taxation.    62
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